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FEDERAL COURTS - INDIANS: CAN CONGRESS
CONSTITUTIONALLY ABROGATE STATES' ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUITS INITIATED
BY INDIAN TRIBES?
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of Florida; Poarch Creek Indians
v. State of Alabama, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994)
I. FACTS
This Eleventh Circuit decision represents a consolidation of two
separate district court decisions which reached opposite conclusions on
the same issue.1  In the Florida case, Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida,2 the Tribe filed a complaint alleging that the state did not
respond to the tribe's request for compact negotiations as required by
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).3 The state moved to dismiss
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the state's
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 4 The district court denied
the state's motion to dismiss. 5 Thereafter, the state made an interlocu-
tory appeal of that decision. 6
Conversely, in the second case, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v.
Alabama,7 the State of Alabama effectively asserted the sovereign
immunity defense.8 In Poarch, the district court concluded that suits
brought by Indian tribes against the state were barred by the state's
sovereign immunity when the Indians sought to enforce their right to
negotiate a tribal-state compact under the IGRA.9 The Poarch Creek
Indians appealed the district court's decisions.O
The issue in both of these cases was whether Congress had the
power to enact IGRA. IGRA statedly abrogates the states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity from lawsuits when Indian tribes sue
1. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida; Poarch Creek Indians v. Alabama, 11 F.3d 1016 (11 th
Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995).
2. 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.). Fla. 1992), rev'd II F.3d 1016 (11 th Cir. 1994).
3. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992). The Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA) regulates by providing guidelines for Indian gaming operations. 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d) (1988). Furthermore, IGRA provides the tribes with remedies when a state does not comply
with the guidelines. Id.
4. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 656.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
8. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (dismissing suit
brought under IGRA and granting permission to amend complaint) [hereinafter Poarch 1].
9. Id.
10. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (amending
original complaint and bringing same action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) [hereinafter Poarch II].
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the state in federal district court for failure to negotiate a tribal-state
compact.1
The Eleventh Circuit held that the states did not consent to be sued
by an Indian tribe. The Court further held that although Congress
intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity, IGRA was passed
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause which does not give Congress
the power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity.12
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF STATES
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution describes federal judicial
power. 13 The Eleventh Amendment' 4 modifies two clauses15 within
Article III, Section 2.16 Over time, the Eleventh Amendment has been
interpreted to give sovereign immunity to the states. 17 This rationale had
its origins in the notion that the "King could do no wrong" and that
subjecting the state to lawsuits would hinder state growth and bankrupt
it.18
Although states enjoy sovereign immunity in most circumstances,
this immunity is not absolute. 19 For example, a state may consent to
suit.20 In addition, some government officials are not immune from
lawsuits due to the Ex parte Young doctrine.21 Finally, Congress may
11. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i) (1988). Section 2710 provides: "An Indian tribe may initiate a
cause of action . .. only after the close of the 180-day period beginning on the date on which the
Indian tribe requested the State to enter into negotiations .... " Id.
12. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1019.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XI reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
15. The two clauses within Article III, section 2 which are modified are: "between a State and
Citizens of another State .. ." and "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects."; see infra note 17 (discussing the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment).
16. ERwiN CHEmEINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.2, at 370 (2d ed. 1994).
17. Id. § 7.3, at 374. In describing three theories ((I) constitutional limit on subject matterjurisdiction; (2) common law immunity; and (3) limit only to diversity suits), of the Eleventh
Amendment's meaning, Chemerinsky states that the current view by the Supreme Court adopts the first
theory-that the Eleventh Amendment is a constitutional limitation on subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at
381. This precludes a federal court from hearing suits against state governments. Id. Supporters of
this theory rely on the amendment's exact language: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to. .. ." Id. at 375.
18. MARTN H. RaDISH, FEDERAL J uRislCmION: TEisIONs IN THE ALLOCATION OF J UDICIAL POWEa
179 n.2 (2d ed. 1990).
19. Eg., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, I I F.3d 1016, 1021 (11 th Cir. 1994).
20. E.g., Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity by state officials must be explicitly authorized by the state in its
constitution, statutes, and decisions); see also infra Part IIA.
21. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (establishing the Er parte Young doctrine which allows
an individual to obtain an injunction to force an otherwise immune state officer to comply with federal
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abrogate a state's sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to
certain constitutionally delegated powers.22
1. The Consent Exception
A state may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting in one of
three ways: express consent, state ratification of the federal constitution
(or the "plan of convention"), or by state participation in a congress-
ional program. 23 Express consent is accomplished by an explicit
authorization in the state's constitution or in its statutes.24
Another method by which a state consents to a waiver of sovereign
immunity is by its ratification of the federal Constitution, alternatively
known as the "plan of convention." 25 The underlying rationale of this
theory is that the states gave up certain powers, including immunity from
lawsuits, by ratifying the United States Constitution. 26 In giving up
certain powers, the states are thus seen as implicitly consenting to suits
initiated by the United States or by other states. However, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the "plan of convention" theory of consent does
not extend to include suits initiated by Indian tribes .27
A final, and extremely rare, possibility in which the states may give
their consent is by their participation in a federal program. 28 For
example, in R.B. Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State
law). See also infra Part IILB.
22. E4g., See infra part I. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)..
23. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1021-22.
24. Id. at 1022; see, eg., Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1214 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (finding that
removal of a case from state to federal court does not amount to a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity unless those state officials removing the case are authorized to do so). Ford Motor Co. v.
Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467-68 (1945) (finding that Indiana's state constitution explicitly
provided for provisions to be made by general law to bring suit against the state); Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.9 (1984) (stating that a state's waiver of sovereign
immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in the
federal courts).
25. Id. at 1022; See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 111 S. Ct. 2578,
2582-83 (1991).
26. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1022.
27. See Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2582-83 (finding that the state's surrender of sovereign immunity
from suit by sister states is based on the "mutuality of concession," something not present with either
foreign sovereigns nor Indian tribes). To support its contention of a lack of mutuality of concession,
the Court reasoned that since the tribes did not surrender their immunity to the states at the
constitutional convention to which they were not a party, there could not be "mutuality of concession"
if the Convention had surrendered the states' immunity to Indian tribes. Id. at 2583.
28. R.B. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). The
rareness of the application of this doctrine is exemplified by the fact that, as of the date of Seminole,
waiver by participation in a federal program had only been found once-in Parden. Seminole, 11
F.3d at 1022.
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Docks Department,29 the Supreme Court found that Alabama waived its
sovereign immunity by operating a railroad which was subject to the
Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA).30 The Court, however, has
limited the application of this form of consent in subsequent decisions.3 1
The common thread throughout the rationale of these cases supporting
this contention is that if a state acts in a "typically private" capacity, the
Eleventh Amendment does not apply because sovereign immunity does
not apply to private entities. 32
2. The Ex parte Young Doctrine Exception
In Ex parte Young, 33 the Supreme Court found that state officials do
not always enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.34 Here, the Supreme
Court formally recognized an exception to the general rule which
affords state officials Eleventh Amendment immunity. 35 This is
applicable in the analyses of the suits pending against the governors of
Florida and Alabama.3 6
Although governors may be sued under this doctrine, it does not
apply in two situations. 37  First, it does not apply to a state officer's
29. 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). In the present case, the state was found to have consented to suit
because it operated a railroad for 20 years in a private market in which all employers were subject to
federal regulation. Seminole, II F.3d at 1023 (citing Parden, 377 U.S. at 184).
30. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192. FELA was applicable to every "common carrier by railroad" in
interstate commerce. Id. at 187. FELA provides that: "[e]very common carrier by railroad while
engaged in commerce between any of the several states ... shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce," and that '[u]nder this
chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United States ... ." Federal Employers
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60.
31. See supra note 28 (illustrating that Parden-like consent is not extended to every exercise by
Congress).
32. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (asserting jurisdiction over the State
of Pennsylvania because, similar to a private citizen, it was an 'owner or operator" of land);
Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,284 (1973) (refusing to grant
jurisdiction over a not-for-profit hospital operated by the State of Missouri).
33. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
34. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
35. Id. This posits that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state officer's action is not
directed against the state. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984). In Ex
parte Young, a federal court enjoined Minnesota's Attorney General from enforcing a statute which
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56. The injunction issued did
not violate the Eleventh Amendment because the unconstitutional statute was void. Id. Thus, a state
officer was not acting on the state's behalf when he attempted to enforce such a statute since the state
could not authorize such action. Id. at 159-60.
36. Seminole, II F.3d 1028-29.
37. Ex parte Young, 209 US. at 158.
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discretionary tasks.38 Secondly, Ex parte Young does not apply to cases
in which the suit is, for all practical purposes, against the state.39
3. The Abrogation Exception
The third exception to the Eleventh Amendment state sovereign
immunity is abrogation. 40 States may not use the sovereign immunity
defense if Congress has specifically abrogated it when legislating
pursuant to one of its plenary powers.41
Abrogating state sovereign immunity pursuant to its plenary powers
is subject to two requirements. First, Congress must have the constitu-
tional authority to do So.4 2 Secondly, there must be a clear statutory
expression of the waiver. 43
The Supreme Court has found that Congress only has the
constitutional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity when
legislating pursuant to two constitutional provisions. 4 4  The first
provision is the Empowerment Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45
38. Id. A court cannot control discretionary functions of an official. Id. A court can only direct
affirmative action where the official having some duty to perform not involving discretion, but merely
ministerial in its nature, refuses or neglects to take such action. Id. In that case, the court can direct
the defendant to perform this merely ministerial task. Id. (citing Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92
U.S. 531, 541 (1875)). "The general discretion regarding the enforcement of the laws when and as he
deems appropriate is not interfered with by an injunction which restrains the state officer from taking
any steps towards the enforcement of an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of the complainant."
Id. at 159. In such a case, no affirmative action of any nature is directed, and the official is simply
prohibited from doing that which he had no legal right to do. Id. An injunction to prevent the official
from doing something which he/she had no legal right to do is not an interference with the official's
discretion. Id.
39. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-03. The Supreme Court in Pennhurst stated that a suit is really
against the sovereign if the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain or
interfere with public administration or if the judgment's effect would be to restrain the government
from acting, or to compel it to act. Id. at 101-03.
40. Seminole, 11 F3d at 1023.
41. Id.; see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (finding abrogation in
legislation passed pursuant to Congress' plenary commerce power); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976) (finding abrogation in legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's
Empowerment Clause). Plenary, according to Black's Law Dictionary, means "full, entire, complete,
absolute, perfect, unqualified." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990). In Union Gas, the
Court stated, "[A] provision [which] both expands federal power and contracts state power; that is the
meaning, in fact, of a 'plenary' grant of authority." 491 U.S. at 17.
42. E.g., Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1024.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1023.
45. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455-56 (finding that legislation passed under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is founded upon the expansion of Congress' power while diminishing state
sovereignty). Since the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibitions are directed at the states, they restrict
state power. Id. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce these
restrictions by executive, legislative, or judicial means. Id. at 454 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346-48 (1880)).
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The second provision under which Congress has plenary power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity is the Commerce Clause.46
B. THE PERCEIVED NEED FOR IGRA
In 1988, Congress enacted IGRA as an attempt to respond to the
litigation which raised questions about who had the power to regulate
Indian gaming.47 By enacting IGRA, Congress sought to promote tribal
economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments.48 Furthermore, Congress expressed an intent to shield
tribal gaming from organized crime.49
IGRA's first step toward regulation was to categorize gaming into
three classes. 50 Class I, consisting mainly of social games for small
prizes; 51 Class II, consisting of games like bingo,52 and Class III,
consisting of any other gaming not classified in either Class I or Class
11.53
Classes I and II are largely regulated by the tribe. 54  Class III,
however, is subject to more pervasive state involvement by requiring the
tribe to negotiate a compact with the state. 55 The issues relevant to the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in the present case concern Class III gaming
only. Accordingly, this Comment will focus its analysis on those issues
relevant to Class II gaming.
The reason Congress required tribal-state compacts for Class III
gaming was because both state and federal law enforcement officials
articulated concerns that regulation was necessary in order to prevent the
46. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20 (stating that 'to the extent that the States gave Congress the
authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it
necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable').
47. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988); see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,
221-22 (1987) (concluding that the state of California could not enforce its laws against the Indian
tribes because California only regulated and did not prohibit gaming). This decision left Indian gaming
largely unregulated by the states. Seminole, II F3d at 1019.
48. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988).
49. Id. § 2702(2); S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CAN.
3071.
50. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6)-(8) (1988).
51. Class I includes 'social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of
Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or
celebrations.' 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1988).
52. Class 11 includes electronic and computerized bingo and card games which are explicitly
authorized by state law. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (1988). Class H gaming does not include any banking
card games (e.g., baccarat, chemin de fer. or blackjack) or electronic or electromechanical
facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines. Id.
A great deal of litigation has arisen concerning the definition and subsequent classification of
Class II and Class Ill gaming. Eg., Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. Hope, 16 F3d 261
(8th Cir. 1994); Spokane Indian Tribe v. United States, 972 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1992).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1988).
54. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6)-(7) (1988).
55. Id. § 2710(d)(3).
606
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUITS
infiltration of criminal behavior.5 6 As could be expected, some tribes
opposed this assertion of state or federal jurisdiction over their
industry.5 7  In order to reconcile the states' perceived need for
enforcement of gaming laws and the important interest in preserving
tribal sovereignty, the Indian Affairs Committee created a provision in
IGRA requiring tribal-state compacts for all Class Ill gaming.5 8 Further,
IGRA specifically requires the states to enter into the negotiation process
in good faith.59
In the event a state either does not respond to the Indian tribe's
request to negotiate or does not negotiate in good-faith, the Indian tribe
may initiate a claim in a United States district court 60 and eventually
receive permission to operate the Class III gaming from the Secretary of
the Interior.61 At this point, some states try to defend themselves by
claiming their right to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 62 In
order to claim sovereign immunity, the states contend that by enacting
this provision, which allows the tribes to sue the states in federal court,
Congress unconstitutionally abrogated their sovereign immunity. 63
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida; Poarch Creek Indians v. Alabama,
was granted a Writ of Certiorari, 64 so this question will be resolved in the
near future.
56. S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071.
It is important to note that the main issue Congress weighed in the formation of IGRA was how
to preserve the tribes' right to self-government, while protecting both the tribe and the gaming public
from "unscrupulous persons." Id.
57. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 221-22 (finding that in states where gaming is allowed, the tribes
have a right to conduct their gaming activities free from state regulation).
58. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3) (1988); see S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. 3071 (reasoning that the purpose of a tribal-state compact is to allow the unique
governmental objectives of both the tribe and the state to be realized).
59. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988).
60. Id. §§ 2710(d)(7)(A) - (11)(1).
61. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
Although the tribe may eventually receive permission to operate Class III gaming from the
Secretary, it can only do so after following a time-consuming procedure. First in this procedure, the
tribe must request negotiations with the state. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). If the state refuses to negotiate,
the tribe then initiates a lawsuit at the close of a 180-day period. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i) (1988). The
180-day period begins tolling from the date the tribe requested compact negotiation with the state. Id.
After that, the court may order the state and tribe to negotiate and conclude a compact within another
60 days. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (1988). If the state and the tribe still cannot reach a consensus, the
court may appoint a mediator. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv). The state now has yet another 60 days to
accept the mediator's proposal. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi). Only then, after at least a 300 day period,
may the Secretary of the Interior prescribe procedures for the tribe to conduct its Class ll gaming in
that state. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (detailing the process a tribe must follow before obtaining a
judicial remedy). This constraint in the compacting process leaves the tribal gaming venture
suspended for nearly one year, and thus, effectively prevents the tribes from gaining the prospective
revenue of the Class III gaming venture for that period. See id. § 2710(d)(7).
62. Eg., Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1019; Sault Sainte Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. State of
Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484, 1487-88 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
63. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1019.
64. 11 F.3d 1016 (llth Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S.Ct.932(1995).
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C. MAJORITY RULE
Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether IGRA
can constitutionally abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, many
federal circuit and district courts have decided this issue. The Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have ruled that Congress may abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity under IGRA.65
In contrast, only a district court in the Sixth Circuit has found it
unconstitutional for Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity
under IGRA.66
III. ANALYSIS
The State of Florida and the State of Alabama asserted that IGRA
unconstitutionally abrogated their Eleventh Amendment right to
sovereign immunity. 67 Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states are
generally immune from lawsuits. 68  Because this right is not absolute, 69
this Comment will refer to the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of the three
exceptions to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
A. THE CONSENT EXCEPTION
A state may consent to waiving sovereign immunity in one of three
ways.70 Express consent is accomplished by explicit authorization in the
65. See Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1430 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that
just as the Interstate Commerce Clause shifted the balance of state-federal power to Congress to
regulate the states, the Indian Commerce Clause shifted the balance of power to Congress and
subsequently gave it plenary power to regulate relations with Indians); Spokane Tribe of Indians v.
Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the plenary power of the Indian Commerce
Clause under which IGRA was passed is no less than the plenary power of the Interstate Commerce
Clause); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 280 (8th Cir. 1993) (agreeing with
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 657-63 (S.D. Fla. 1992), and stating that: '[gliven
Congress' plenary authority over Indian relations ... and the uniquely federal issues raised when such
authority is exercised .... Congress, when acting pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause has the
power to abrogate the States' [Eleventh Amendment] immunity.").
66. Sault Sainte Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (W.D.
Mich. 1992). In Sault Sainte Marie, the court found that the Indian Commerce Clause does not give
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id. In so finding, the court relied upon two
cases-Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991), and Spokane
Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991). The latter case, however, was
subsequently overruled. Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994). The
basis for the Sault Sainte Marie court's finding was simplistic-it could not extend the rationale of
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which grants to Congress power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, to Indian Commerce Clause analysis. Sault Sainte Marie, 800 F. Supp. at 1489-90.
67. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1020 (11 th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115
S. Ct. 932 (1995).
68. See supra notes 21, 37 (discussing the general rule of sovereign immunity and constitutional
authority for congressional abrogation of it).
69. Seminole, 11 F.3dat 1021.
70. See supra Part IIA.1 (discussing the three ways in which a state may consent to widving
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states' constitution or in its statutes. 7 1 In Poarch Creek Indians v.
Alabama,72 the defendants showed that Article I, section 14 of the
Alabama Constitution specifically reserves its sovereign immunity.73 In
Seminole, Florida did not raise this defense. 74 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs
failed to show that the state had expressly consented to suit.75^ Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit found that neither the State of Alabama nor the State of
Florida had expressly consented to waiver of their sovereign immunity.76
Another method by which a state can consent to a waiver of its
sovereign immunity is by ratification of the federal Constitution,
alternatively known as the "plan of convention." 77 In the present case,
the judge followed the precedent set forth in Blatchford.78 In Blatch-
ford, the court found that states had not waived their sovereign immunity
in suits initiated by Indians. 79  The Eleventh Circuit stated that the
simple fact that the plaintiffs in both Poarch and Seminole were Indian
tribes extinguished the possibility of using the "plan of convention"
doctrine to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity.80
The final method by which the states may give their consent is by
their participation in a congressional program. 8 ' The relevant example
would be Florida's and Alabama's participation in negotiating
tribal-state compacts under IGRA.
In order to argue that the states have given their consent by
participation in a congressional program, the Indian tribes in Seminole
relied on RB. Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks
sovereign immunity).
71. Seminole, 1 F3d at 1022.
72. Poarch 1, 776 F. Supp. 550, 554 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
73. ALA. CONST., art. I, § 14; see Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (stating that "it
appears no consent could be given under Article 1, Section 14 [of the Alabama Constitution]').
74. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1022.
75. Id.
76. Id.; but see Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. 459, 467-68 (1945) (finding that Indiana's state
constitution explicitly provided for provisions to be made by general law to bring suit against the state).
77. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1022; see, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle
Village, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2582-83 (1991) (finding that states surrendered their sovereign immunity
from lawsuits because each state concedes its immunity to the other).
78. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1022 (stating that the "plan of convention' form of consent is not
applicable to Indian tribes because of a lack of mutuality of concession); see supra note 26.
79. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2583.
80. Id. at 2584; but see Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1431 (9th Cir.
1994) (noting the difference between waiver and abrogation); Spokane Tribe of Indians v.
Washington, 28 F.3d 991,995 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that Blatchfords holding "that a general waiver
of immunity from suits against tribes cannot be inferred from the Constitution itself, does not address
the question of whether Congress may abrogate that immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause
when it acts with the clarity of purpose that it did in the IGRA").
81. Seminole, 11 F3d at 1022. See supra part H.A.! (discussing the background and authority
for when a state is perceived to have "consented" through their participation in a congressional
program); see also infra note 87 (providing examples of the court's interpretation of when a state has
consented to a waiver of its sovereign immunity by its participation in a federal program).
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Department.8 2 The Supreme Court in Parden found that the state waived
its sovereign immunity by operating an interstate railroad-an industry
which was regulated in part by FELA.83 The Eleventh Circuit in
Seminole, however, distinguished Parden and concluded that subsequent
Supreme Court cases render Parden inapplicable.8 4 In distinguishing
Parden, the Eleventh Circuit first stated that the State of Alabama chose
to leave a sphere. that was exclusively its own and enter a field that was
federally regulated, namely, operating a for-profit railroad.85 In so
doing, Alabama, as with all the participants in the railroad industry, was
bound by federal regulations and had impliedly consented to suit as was
authorized by the regulation.8 6 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit
reasoned, the Alabama and Florida state governments were negotiating
with Indian tribes.87 This, the court found, was not a private activity like
the railroad activity in Parden.88 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit distin-
guished Parden and found that Alabama and Florida had not consented
to suit like the Terminal Railway in Parden.8 9
B. THE Ex PARTE YOUNG DOCTRINE EXCEPTION
The next exception to sovereign immunity is the Ex parte Young
doctrine. 90 The Eleventh Circuit determined that the governors were not
82. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1022 (citing R.B. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't.,
377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)).
83. See id. (stating that "Congress conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate
commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the [FELA]; by thereafter
operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be taken to have accepted that condition
and thus to have consented to suit.").
84. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1022. Factors such as Alabama's voluntary participation, that the
operation was for-profit, and that it was a private enterprise especially concerned the court. Id. at
1023.
85. Id. (citing Parden, 377 U.S. at 196).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (stating that the negotiation process between the state governments and the sovereign
Indian tribes is 'hardly a 'private' activity.")
89. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1023. In Seminole, the state governments were negotiating with Indian
tribes-a typically private activity. Id. In contrast, the court in Parden found that the state had left its
traditional state authority realm and entered the private market where all employers were subject to
FELA. 377 U.S. at 192.
Furthermore, according to the Eleventh Circuit, subsequent Supreme Court decisions limit
Parden's applicability. See, eg, Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 286-87 (1973) (declining to extend Parden-like consent to a state operated, non-profit facility).
In doing this, the Court was thus refusing to extend Parden to every exercise by Congress of its
Commerce Power. Id. See also, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,673 (1974) (refusing to find Illinois
had given Parden-like constructive consent to suit by participating in a federal program by agreeing to
administer federal and state funds); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985)
(finding that simply receiving federal funds did not establish that California had consented to suit).
The Atascadero court went on to state, 'we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to
consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 238
n.l.
90. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See supra Part IIHA.2.
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subject to suit under the Ex parte Young doctrine because this case fell
into both of the exceptions to the Ex parte Young doctrine.91 Specifical-
ly, Ex parte Young does not apply to discretionary tasks, 92 nor does it
apply to suits which are, in all practicality, against the state. 93 In
Seminole, the terms of the compact were discretionary and IGRA only
binds the states to negotiate tribal-state compacts-not the governors. 94
C. THE ABROGATION EXCEPTION
In limited situations, Congress may abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. 95 The first question in the court's
abrogation analysis was whether Congress intended to abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity. 9 6  Although the court did not find
Congress' intent to be clear at first glance, it nonetheless found the
manifestation of Congress' intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity
within IGRA.97 The Eleventh Circuit explained that IGRA gave the
federal district courts original jurisdiction in three cases, one of which
was "any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the
failure of a state to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact." 98  The court reasoned
91. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028-29.
92. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158 (1908).
93. Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 US. 89, 101-02 (1984).
94. 11 F.3d at 1028. In Seminole, the court found that IGRA required negotiations of a contract,
the terms of which were to be determined by the states' and the tribes' discretion. Id. In addition, the
Eleventh Circuit stated that IGRA foresaw the state exercising its discretion by not negotiating a
compact. Id. at 1028-29. Its statutory response was to provide a federal court remedy for the tribe in
those situations. Id. Each of these points, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, supported a conclusion that
compact negotiations were discretionary. Id. IGRA's language only refers to the state-not once
does it mention "Governor." 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1988). The reason for this is that the purpose of
these lawsuits was to compel tribal-state compact negotiations with the state, and not the governors.
Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1029.
95. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1029. See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989)
(finding that legislation passed pursuant to Congress' Article 1, Section 8 plenary power over
commerce abrogated sovereign immunity) . Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 US. 445, 456 (1976) (finding
that legislation passed pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment abrogated sovereign
immunity).
96. Seminole, 1I F3d at 1024.
97. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (1988) (giving tribes a federal court remedy for a state's
failure to negotiate in good faith).
Many jurisdictions have found that Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity when
it enacted IGRA. See, e.g., Kickapoo, 818 F. Supp. at 1427 ("[A] clearer statement of the intent to
abrogate is difficult to envision."); Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 658 (stating that it is 'beyond
peradventure that, in expressly providing for federal jurisdiction over claims brought by Indian tribes
against States to compel good faith negotiations under IGRA . . . Congress made its intention to
abrogate the States' immunity in this context 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute'."). Even
courts which do not find that Congress may constitutionally abrogate state sovereign immunity under
IGRA have nonetheless found that it was Congress' intent to do so. See Sault Sainte Marie, 800 F.
Supp. at 1489 ('clear statement of waiver").
98. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (1988). The other two cases where IGRA allows a United
States district court remedy are: "any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a
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that if Congress did not intend to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, this clause would have no purpose
since the only possible defendant is the state.99
The next question answered within the court's analysis was whether
Congress possessed the power under the Constitution to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.l00 In order to answer
that question, the court had to first determine under which constitutional
provision Congress enacted IGRA. 101
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that Congress had the
power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
only when it acts pursuant to one of its plenary powers. 102 The Court in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer103 found that Congress had the power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Empowerment Clause (or section 5)
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 104 According to the tribe in Seminole,
IGRA created liberty and property interests-both of which were
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.105 However, since the
Eleventh Circuit did not find that IGRA created either of these interests,
it determined that Congress could not have passed IGRA pursuant to its
plenary power.106
The alternative argument posed by the tribe was that Congress
passed IGRA pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.107 The tribe
class Ill gaming activity ... conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact,' and 'any cause of
action initiated by the Secretary to enforce the procedures prescribed under subparagraph (B)(vii)'
which gives the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Indian tribe, the power to prescribe
procedures under which class IlI gaming may be conducted when the State fails to negotiate in good
faith.- 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)-(iii) (1988).
99. Seminole, I F3d at 1024.
100. Id. at 1025.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1023. Accord Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 19-20; Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456; see
also Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the
Indian Commerce Clause empowers Congress to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity); see supra part II.A.3 (providing general background on Congress' power to abrogate
sovereign immunity pursuant to one of its plenary powers).
103. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
104. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
105. Seminole, I I F.3d at 1025; see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The liberty
and property interest arguments were dealt with summarily by the Eleventh Circuit. Seminole, 11 F3d
at 1025. It did not find either interest present because the tribes did not have a 'legitimate claim of
entitlement." Id.; see Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (finding that these interests are created only when there is
a legitimate claim of entitlement to them). The Eleventh Circuit found that IGRA does not create an
'entitlement," rather it simply creates a process by which tribes and states may negotiate gaming
compacts. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1025; see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (1988). If the State
negotiates in good faith, IGRA does not give the tribe any further protection. See, eg., 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d) (providing remedies only when the State does not negotiate in good faith).
106. Seminole, 11 F3d at 1025.
107. Id.
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argued that the legislative history of IGRA indicated that one of IGRA's
goals was to protect tribal gaming from organized crime. 108 The tribe
argued that this legislative history indicated that IGRA was passed under
the auspices of the Interstate Commerce Clause. 109
The Eleventh Circuit, however, disagreed. 10 It stated that Congress
was not concerned with how organized crime would affect interstate
commerce."'l Rather, the Eleventh Circuit found that Congress was
concerned with whether Indian tribes would be the primary recipient of
the gaming operation's benefits.112 Also, the Eleventh Circuit found that
Congress wanted to promote strong tribal governments.11 3 Accordingly,
the Eleventh Circuit was convinced that the impact of organized crime
on interstate commerce was not a part of Congress' intent in its
enactment of IGRA. 114 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit stated that IGRA
could not have been passed pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause. 115
By process of elimination, the court found that the only other power
by which Congress could have enacted IGRA was under the Indian
Commerce Clause.ll 6 Thus, the next pertinent question in the court's
analysis was whether the Indian Commerce Clause empowered Congress
to abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity."i7
The Eleventh Circuit unequivocally responded to that question in
the negative.18 Upon coming to its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit
found that Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.J19 was the most relevant
Supreme Court case on this subject. 120 In that case, the Court stated that
Congress had the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
108. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (1988); S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. 3071.
109. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1025.
110. Id. at 1026.
111. Id.; but see 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (1988) (stating that part of the congressional policy behind
IGRA included shielding Indian tribes from organized crime and other corrupting influences).
112. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1026.
113. Id. The tribes have a right to self-government. S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N. 3071. By promoting strong tribal governments in IGRA,
Congress is furthering this right.
114. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1026.
115. Id.; but cf. supra note 72 (noting that the Indian Commerce Clause empowers Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under IGRA).
116. Seminole, 11 F3d at 1026.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1028; but see supra note 72 (providing authority for the constitutionality of IGRA
passed pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause).
119. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
120. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1026 (finding relevance in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1
(1989).
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sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause. 121
In deciding that the Indian Commerce Clause did not empower
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Circuit
distinguished Union Gas from Seminole with two lines of argument.122
The first line of argument supporting this conclusion limited Union
Gas' rationale to its facts. 123 The Eleventh Circuit stated that the
decision in Union Gas was based upon Congress' power to legislate
pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause-not the Indian Commerce
Clause.124 Furthermore, since the Interstate Commerce Clause and the
Indian Commerce Clause have "unique qualities," the Eleventh Circuit
stated that Union Gas' rationale was inapplicable to Indian Commerce
Clause analysis.125
The Eleventh Circuit also reasoned that Union Gas only allowed for
federal jurisdiction over states when the states were involved in a
typically private activity.1 26 As an example of such an activity, the
Eleventh Circuit cited Parden v. Terminal Railway.127 In Parden, the
United States Supreme Court allowed for federal jurisdiction over the
State of Alabama when it was operating a for-profit railroad in interstate
commerce.128 The Eleventh Circuit opined that federal jurisdiction was
121. Id.; see Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20 (explaining by way of a four-member plurality that
the Interstate Commerce Clause withholds power from the states at the same time it confers it on
Congress). Since a delegation of such power would not be complete without the authority to make
states liable for damages, the states must have given up their immunity in cases where Congress found
it necessary to subject them to liability. Id. What this means is that the states were not "unconsenting'
to liability, rather they gave their consent to liability by ratification of the federal Constitution. Id. at
20; see also infra note 143 (stating that the Union Gas court referred to the 'commerce clause' in its
opinion, but that some courts have restricted its application only to the Interstate Commerce Clause).
122. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1027. The Eleventh Circuit mentioned the fact that Union Gas is a
plurality decision and that, if decided by present members of the Court, the court could reach the
opposite conclusion-that the Interstate Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit stated that this was not a valid
reason to disregard Union Gas. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Both Tribes argued that the Union Gas Court referred to the "Commerce Clause," and
did not specifically mention the "Interstate Commerce Clause." Id. at 1027 n.13. Thus, the Tribes
argued that reference to "Commerce Clause" implicates all the commerce clauses-Interstate, Indian,
and Foreign. Id. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged this imprecise generic reference to 'Commerce
Clause,' but interpreted it to only include the Interstate Commerce Clause since that was the portion
upon which the Union Gas' analysis focused. Id.
125. Id. at 1027. The differences between the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian
Commerce Clause were explained in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
The Interstate Commerce Clause's purpose was to provide Congress with plenary power to maintain
*free trade among the States.' Id. at 192. In contrast, the Indian Commerce Clause was to provide
Congress with plenary power to legislate in Indian Affairs. Id. At the same time, however, the
Seminole court conceded that Congress has the power to regulate states pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1027.
126. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028.
127. Id. (citing Parden, 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
128. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
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allowed in Parden because every railroad operator was subjected to the
same federal laws. 129
Consistent with the foregoing example, according to the Eleventh
Circuit, the Supreme Court did not allow federal jurisdiction over the
State of Missouri in Employees v. Missouri Department of Public Health
and Welfare.13o In Employees, the Supreme Court stated that Missouri's
operation of a non-proprietary, not-for-profit hospital was "wholly
within [the state's] sphere of authority" and thus was not a typically
private activity over which Congress had jurisdiction.131 As such, the
Court denied jurisdiction because Missouri was acting in a capacity in
which private industry did not operate.132
In the present case, the Tribes tried to invoke federal court
jurisdiction over Alabama and Florida because each state failed to
negotiate a tribal-state compact for Class III gaming in violation of
IGRA.133 Rather than finding tribal-state negotiations to be a "typically
private" activity to which federal jurisdiction would apply under Union
Gas,134 the Eleventh Circuit found the compact negotiations to, be
"wholly within [the state's] sphere of authority" and thus not subject to
federal jurisdiction.135
The Eleventh Circuit believed the Supreme Court's intent under
Union Gas was to allow for federal jurisdiction only when the state acts
outside the typical realm of its authority or in a typically private
activity.136  Since the Eleventh Circuit found that tribal-state compact
negotiations were within the typical realm of state authority, Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity continued to protect the states from
lawsuits.137 The Eleventh Circuit further stated that even if the-rationale
in Union Gas generally conferred upon Congress the power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause, Congress
would not be able to do so in an area typically reserved for the states. 138
129. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028. A similar situation arose in Union Gas. 491 U.S. at 13. There,
again, a state was subjected to liability under the Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act since
it was an "owner or operator' of land, a status typical of private citizens. Id. at 13.
130. Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 282 (1973).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Seminole, Il F.3d at 1028.
134. See id. (stating that federal jurisdiction over states is only allowed when the states engage in
a typically private activity); see also supra note 98 (giving an example of a typically private activity).
135. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028 (relying on the distinction made in Employees, 411 U.S. at 282).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.; but see supra note 72 (providing authority for and analyses by courts which have
recognized Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause).
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The court then stated that negotiating compacts with Indian tribes was
such an area reserved for the states. 139
By way of conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit stated that since the facts
of these cases do not fit into any of the three exceptions to sovereign
immunity, Florida's and Alabama's Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity effectively bars the suits brought by the Indian tribes.140
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The implications of this decision may have significant effects on the
Indian Gaming industry. As the decision now stands, tribes in the
Eleventh Circuit are no longer afforded the federal court remedy which
IGRA gave them if the state fails to negotiate a Tribal-State compact.
The Supreme Court has the option of declaring the entire Act unconsti-
tutional,141 or just the provision allowing the tribes a federal court
remedy .142
If the United States Supreme Court overrules Seminole by stating
that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under IGRA, the
Supreme Court would uphold the Eighth,143 Ninth, and Tenth Circuits'
decisions.144 This would continue to provide a remedy for tribes which
meet state officials who refuse to negotiate for Class III gaming activities
to be conducted by the tribes within the state.
If, however, the Supreme Court affirms the Eleventh Circuit's
decision, North Dakota law would be overturned. As previously stated,
tribes in the Eighth Circuit are able to bring suit against the State in
federal court for non-compliance with the terms in IGRA.145 However,
"if the 11 th Amendment proves to be a bar to tribal suits against states
and state officials, then an important provision of the [IGRA] will have
139. Id.
140. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1029.
141. A positive consequence of this for the tribe would be that they no longer would be required
to negotiate tribal-state compacts. On the down side, however, gaming regulation would revert back
to what it was prior to IGRA.
142. This, quite obviously, would put the tribes in a real bind by requiring a compact to conduct
Class ll gaming, yet not supplying a remedy if the state fails to negotiate one. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710
(d)(3) (1988) (requiring tribes to negotiate a tribal-state compact before they may conduct Class III
gaming). Thus, the state by not negotiating can effectively obstruct the tribe from conducting Class m
tribal gaming. See supra note 60 (discussing the procedure the tribes must follow in order to eventually
get the Secretary of the Interior's approval to conduct Class Ill gaming).
143. In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, the court stated that Congress could
effectively abrogate state sovereign immunity in its enactment of IGRA. 3 F.3d 273, 281 (8th Cir.
1993).
144. See supra note 72.
145. See supra note 72.
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been undermined. The tribes will be left without a remedy when a state.
. refuses to negotiate in good faith." 14 6
An affirmation of this decision has enormous constitutional
ramifications which transcend into non-Indian issues as well. Specifical-
ly, the Union Gas decision, which provides that Congress' plenary power
under the Commerce Clause includes its power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, could be on unstable ground.147
Even if the Supreme Court found that Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce did not give Congress the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, "Congress' broader authority over tribal affairs
would remain." 148 In any event, the Supreme Court's decision on this
issue is very important to tribes, in part because gaming is a lucrative
business and provides them with much needed revenue. Reference to
gaming to as the "new buffalo" is poignant. As Gaiashkibos stated
before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs: "Just as the buffalo
herds of old did, gaming provides many Indian people with the basic
necessities of life." 149
Lauralyn Brown
146. Oversight Hearing Before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs on the Implementation of
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102nd Cong., March 18, 1992 (testimony of Anthony J. Hope,
Chairman, National Indian Gaming Commission, U.S. Congress, Senate).
147. See CHRMINSKY, supra note 16, at 381-82 (discussing the current Court's composition and
the real possibility that if decided today, the Union Gas decision could very well turn out differently).
148. See Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating
implicitly that Congress' authority over tribal affairs empowers it to enact IGRA).
149. Gaiashkibos, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (April 26, 1994)
(1994 WL 230688 (F.D.C.H.)).
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